

DR. MANUEL S. HASSASSIAN

**THE HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF
THE ARMENIAN QUESTION
AND THE CONFLICT OVER
"NAGORNO KARABAGH"
"ARSTAKH"**



**PALESTINIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS - JERUSALEM**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Historical Armenia, situated at the "crossroads of the world", between the Black, Caspian and the Mediterranean Seas, is the homeland of a people whose culture and history extends over a period of 3,000 years. A country early civilized and the first state to accept Christianity as its religion in 301. A.D., Armenia was burdened by a rule more onerous than it had ever experienced. The period of 1890-1921, is of great significance because it found the Armenian people and its land amidst one of the greatest upheavals of modern history. Two of the mightiest empires of the region, the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Tsarist Empire generated huge forces which shaped the destiny of the peoples anew. World War I, the labor movements, the Armenian Deportations and Genocide and finally, the Russian Revolution of 1917, happening one after the other in a short period of time, put their imprint on the history of the region.

The year 1988 marks the seventy third anniversary of the Armenian Genocide of over one and a half million Armenians, who were killed in what has been described as "The Genocide of the Twentieth Century". The Armenians as a Christian minority in the Ottoman Empire, often became the chattels of the oppressive Sultan and the slaves of his corrupt officialdom. Systematically, their rights for nationhood had been denied and consequently, were subjected to the menace of extinction and to the floodtides of Xenophobia and injustice. Above all, the Armenians had to endure official discrimination, inequality, the inadmissibility of legal testimony and the prohibition of bearing arms, a heavy price they paid in order to retain their religion, language, culture and sense of identity. However, being the Victims of a national trauma, the Armenians cannot stop remembering unless justice is done.

Genocide, a deplorable feature of modern history and the most heinous of international crimes, has been committed through the ages and has shocked the conscience of mankind. A cursory

glance through the pages of history, is adequate to unveil enough evidence, that genocide has been used as a weapon of political warfare on the domestic and international levels. Usually, genocide takes the form of organized violence directed by a state against defenseless people, and according to James H. Tashjian, a noted Armenian historian,

"The international crime of genocide, a neologism only lately coined to connote the destruction in whole or in part (of) a national, ethnic, racial or religious groups", is as old as mankind itself yet, tragically, its prevention or punishment has only in our day become the purpose of the peoples of the World".(1)

The protracted Turko-Armenian conflict, marked by international massacres, eventually, was resolved during World War I, by a governmental decree issued in Istanbul. This decree issued the death warrant to the Armenian population which was to be uprooted from its ancestral homeland and systematically deported to the Syrian desert. The overall picture portrayed by the foreign diplomatic corps, was that of a deportation - destruction syndrome, entailing the "murder of a nation". Today, Armenians in Turkey have dwindled in number to 70,000, mostly located in Istanbul, as a community which is in a process of constant erosion. This is the culmination of the Turkification policy implemented by the previous regimes and is being completed by the current regime with all recourse to oppression, illegality and strict administrative measures.

At any rate, the Armenians of today are still suffering from the injustices inflicted upon them in the past and it would be extremely difficult for them to disconnect present and past injustices in favor of future improvements. It is worthwhile mentioning, that Armenian independence was declared in 1918 by the Armenians themselves, however, the Allies failed to give it their support. The Armenian Republic lasted two years and then disappeared in the midst of Turkish and Russian political maneuvering when the two countries were jockeying for territorial and political influence in the region.

The Armenian Republic could not survive the strains of war in addition to a ravaging famine and a poor economy. Consequently, it was easily dislodged by the Armenian Communists who were assisted by their fellow Russian comrades. Armenia was henceforth without independence and its territories were once again divided between Russia and Turkey.

In the following pages, we will delve into the subject of Armenian history to give more details of the points raised in this introduction. Turkish genocide of the Armenians will highlight their history simply because it has become the most important element in the conscience of Armenians. Furthermore, we will discuss the genesis of the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict, an issue that had been dormant since 1923, when the province was officially made under the administrative jurisdiction of Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, which neighbours Soviet Armenia. The history, however, goes deeper than this.

II. THE HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

Armenia - a country linking Central Asia to Turkish Anatolia - has been a regional bone of contention throughout the course of its history.(2) held together by their common religion and language, the Armenians preserved their autonomy through successive political upheavals in the region, by a combination of armed force and political alliances with the Christian World.(3) After the fall of the Armenian independent kingdom in 1375 A.D. and as a result of various Turkish - Persian, Russian - Persian and Russian - Turkish wars in subsequent centuries, Armenia was partitioned into what became known as Turkish Armenia and Russian Armenia, the larger part going to Turkey.

While Armenians lived under comparatively tolerable conditions in the Russian section, they were unable to enjoy similar conditions of life in the Turkish section where their culture was suppressed and their freedom of action was curbed by various

expressions of turkish intolerance and systematic oppression.(4) Their general situation in the Turkish section was the essence of what became known in hisrory as the "Armenian Question".(5)

At the beginning of the 19th century, the crisis in the Ottoman Empire became intense, which in turn paved the way for Russia and the Western powers to encroach upon its independence, by establishing their spheres of influence in the area.(6) Thus, the central problem confronting the ruling Sultans was the rule over numerous peoples who had distinctive ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical traditions, like the Arabs, Slavs, Rumanians, Armenians, Greeks and Kurds. However, to maintain strict control over diverse nationalities in the Empire, the Ottoman Turks resorted to military force, hence discarding the concepts of inter-racial equality and universal human political rights for the peoples of the Empire.

In fact, for almost three centuries, from the 16th throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman Turks maintained the same social and administrative structures, that were characterized by feudalism, religious fanaticism, palace rule and above all military force. The Ottoman Turks were simply incapable of stemming the decline and dissolution of the Empire.

The history of the 19th century Ottoman Empire is a history of abortive attempts, undertaken in response to both internal and external pressures, to institute reforms. In 1839, sultan abdul Mejid introduced a charter of reforms called "Hatti-Sherif". Except for the military, the impact of these reforms on the Turkish Christians was negligible. In 1856, Sultan Mejid issued the "Hatti-Humayun", the so-called Magna Carta of Turkey. Shortly after this document was issued, guarantees for internal reforms in the Ottoman Empire incorporated in the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856) following the Crimean War, but the assurances were of little avail. The provision in the "Hatti-Humayun" regarding religious liberty, for example, was ignored and the oppression continued.(7)

The avowed principles of these reform movements were the establishment of inter - racial equality, freedom of conscience and religion, and the security of life and property. None of these efforts succeeded because Turkish rulers were reluctant to institute genuine reforms and risk the loss of power. However, the reforms to which the Ottoman government paid only lip service during the 19th century, were only intended to avoid the intervention of the European Powers. The justification for European and Russian efforts to intervene in the internal policies of the Empire was the protection of Christian interests in the Muslim World, but all efforts to carry thorough reforms only caused increasing hostility on the part of Turks against minorities in general, and the Armenians in particular.

III. THE ORIGINS OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

To understand the Armenian situation in Turkey, it is important to trace the historical development of their struggle for self-determination. To make their plight known to Turkish authorities, the Armenians organized in 1860 a General Assembly in Istanbul. Through this Assembly Armenians in six vilayets (Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Kharpert, Diyarbekir and Sivas) articulated their most serious grievances, particularly their claim of mistreatment by Turks, Kurds, and Circassians.(8) The Assembly became their spokesman and by 1869, it had become the unofficial representative of the Armenian people, constantly making demands upon the Turkish government for improvements in the condition of Armenians. In 1869, the Assembly decided on a more systematic approach, by first defining the Armenian problem and second, by proposing concrete solution. After a lengthy month in 1870, a blue- ribbon committee of ten was elected to investigate and study the provincial problems and later make some recommendations for their solution. At the time, it was obvious that the Armenians were not speaking a separate and independent state of their own but only to have equal status with Turks on the grounds they were themselves citizens of the Turkish

Empire.(9) This comment about the Assembly's demands did not escape the attention of liberal Turks, one of whom was quoted by Arpiar Arpiarian in Nor Guiank (New Life):

"If the Armenian recommendations of 1870-72 had been acted upon, not in Antolia but in Romelia, we would not have been put through such a terrible time. The recommendations contain nothing to harm our [Turkish] self - interests, nothing to lessen the Sultan's powers, no invitation of European intervention".(10)

The point becomes more clear if we can look at the Assembly's report and study some, not all, of the more important grievances cited. This will also give us an idea of the Armenian view of their own conditions in Turkey as well as the Armenian view of the Armenian Question which would soon become an international concern.

In the area of taxation, the report about gross inequities, especially with regard to four types of taxes.(11) First, the military - exemption tax, which non - Muslims had to pay in lieu of military service, was based upon outdated census. People who were already dead or had immigrated were taxed. As a result, the report stated, many Armenians were converting to Islam to avoid paying tax for their dead and absent relatives. Second, property and income taxes were inflated far beyond assessments on equivalent Muslim properties and incomes. Third, taxes required from tenant farmers were unduly heavy also because of inflated assessments of crop values. In addition, Armenian tenants had to pay one - tenth of this tax in cash. Many of these tenants were already over burdened by other liabilities and, therefore, could not pay. Lastly, Armenians were required to pay into a reserve fund which was set up to help poor peasants who had difficulty buying seeds or purchasing essential needs. Although the ideas of a reserve fund was a good one, Armenians found themselves paying into the fund but getting nothing out of it.

In the area of government abuses, the Assembly's report recalled some of the more serious grievances.(12) It referred to

instances when Turkish local officials imposed economic hardships upon Armenians without due process of law. Some Armenians suffered even death at the hands of ruthless local officials. Local officials also interfered in Armenian religious rights including feast and burial ceremonies and rites. In addition, there were instances in which women were "dishonored" and children were abused. Moreover, authority over the public domain was abused and Armenians were forced, as individuals and as institutions, to pay money or accept arbitrary confiscations of property for the building of palaces, the transportation of Turkish troops, or for other reasons not authorized by law.

The Assembly's report made specific recommendations as solutions to specific grievances. In the area of taxation, it recommended that Armenians be recruited into armed forces on the same footing as others of the Muslim religion:

"Let the Porte [Turkish ruler] know," stated the report "that we [the Armenians] are ready to serve and spill our blood for the fatherland alongside our Muslim countrymen."

This recommendation, if adopted, would naturally eliminate the military - exemption tax. In dealing with the problem of tax inflation, the report recommended "Post assessment lists" to include both Muslim and non-Muslim property assessments. It was thought that this public procedure would help eliminate the unfair practice of over - assessing Armenian property value by listing it with Muslim assessments. Finally, the report recommended that the existing tax system, which employed tax collectors known as "tax farmers," be replaced by direct collection system. The "tax farmers" were allowed to impose whatever tax amounts they wished to collect as long as they paid the government the fixed amounts it required. The new system, the report believed, would do away with inequities and would bring more revenues for the government.(13)

In the second area of "government abuses," or abuses by the

local officials, the report recommended a system of inspection to enable central government officials to check the abuse of local officials. It recommended changes in the selection procedure of local council members to guarantee that Armenian members would represent more closely the local Armenian population and that Muslim leaders would abuse the representational system.(14) the report also recommended that directives issued by the Porte should be published so people would know their rights and be able to detect abuses and violations by local officials. Finally, the report recommended measures designed to reduce the influence of local feudal lords.(15)

As the preceding trends of abuses and pressure for reform continued, the Armenian National Assembly adopted an attitude of "Wait and See." In 1876, Armenian hopes for reform were revived when Murad IV was inaugurated as a Sultan. The new ruler had the reputation of being a liberal, but unfortunately, he was mentally ill and, consequently, was deposed by his brother, Abdul Hamid II.(16) It is important to note, that Abdul Hamid was approved as his brother's successor only after he had convinced Midhat Pasha, the powerful reformer, that he wished to be a constitutional monarch, and that he would introduce liberal reforms.(17)

For the European diplomats who were participating in the Constantinople Conference of December 1876, Abdul Hamid's promise to promulgate a new constitution was nothing but a political ploy to undermine their position at the conference.(18) The reason of their meeting was a contrived effort, led by Russia, to compel Ottoman acceptance of European - supervised reforms in the Balkans. Both Armenians and Turks showed aversion to the idea of intervention by the European powers in favor of the Balkan Christians, and preferred internal reforms that applied to all parts of the empire alike.

It was hoped that the liberal Ottoman Constitution of 1876, would relieve the burdens of the Christians in general and the

Armenians in particular. Unfortunately, the constitution was replaced by the absolute rule of the sultan after it had been in force for only a few months. The lot of Turkish Armenians was unimproved, and early in 1877, when hostilities broke out between Russia and Turkey, the situation became desperate.

In this war, Russia conquered much of eastern Turkey where there was a heavy concentration of Armenians. The conquest included Bayazid, the vale of Alashkert, Kars, Sarikamish, Olti, Artvin, and Batum.(19) Early in the war, Armenians were loyal to the Turkish Porte. However, during the war, they were subjected to severe punishment by Kurdish irregulars who were paid by the Turkish government. Armenian losses in life and property were very heavy. As a result, Armenians shifted their sympathy to the Russian side. Their National Assembly in Istanbul authorized the Armenian Patriarch to get in touch with the Russians in order to bring about improvements in the lives of Armenians. Specifically, the Patriarch was to ask for guarantees of local self-government from the Russians. Armenians were no longer content with promises of reform since they knew that reforms were promised before and they were always ignored. They wanted greater control over their own affairs which could not be achieved without self-government.(20)

Unfortunately, the Russians were not interested in such extreme Armenian demands, and the Patriarch's mission failed. One reason for the Russian attitude was Britain, which was reluctant to allow Russia to extend its influence beyond certain limits. Thus, when the treaty of San Stefano was signed (March 1878) Armenian demands for local self-government were ignored. Article 16 of this treaty stated:

"...The Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee them security from Kurds and Circassians".(21)

Obviously, the treaty was disappointment to the Armenians. However, for entirely different reasons, British disappointment was even greater. In fact, the British insisted on a total revision of San Stefano. Since Russia did not want military confrontation with Britain it agreed to attend a conference in Berlin, along with the other European powers.

In Berlin, it became clear the British had interests in limiting Russian gains from the 1877-78 war. They wanted to protect their trade and, more specifically, they had ambitions in Cyprus.(22) They had already reached an agreement with the Turks to achieve both goals. The Berlin Treaty (July 1878) reflected British interests. It was agreed that Russia would keep Kars, Ardahan, and Batum while Alashkert and Bayazid would return to Turkish control.(23) Five days later, in the Cyprus Convention, Britain guaranteed Turkey immunity from Russian future expansion. In return, Turkey promised to introduce reforms, "to be agreed upon later between the two powers", for the protection of the Christian population of territories reverting to Turkish sovereignty. Thus, neither San Stefano nor the Berlin Treaty came anywhere close to satisfying Armenian demands for self-government. According to Richard G. Hovannisian, the eastern vilayets were no longer identified as "Armenia" after the Berlin Conference, and the promised reforms were now dependent upon the collective will of the big powers.(24) In effect this meant that "Christian" and "civilized" Europe was to abandon the Armenians who were left to their own resources which were scanty and negligible. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin transformed the Armenian question into an international issue, but the Armenians gained no advantage from that status.

The failure of the European powers to redress Turkish wrongs and the obvious impotence of the Armenians themselves forced the Armenians to tolerate Turkish notorious mistreatment for some time. However, in the latter part of the nineteenth century signs of resistance and outright insurrection appeared among the Armenians. Thus by the 1890s, internationally based,

structured secret societies were replacing earlier local defense groups. The leaders of these organizations never expounded national independence as their goal. Instead, Armenian cultural freedom and regional autonomy were the stated aims of these Armenian revolutionaries. The new organizations were influenced by the ideas of the Armenian Awakening which at that time had reached maturity and were a vital factor in molding the mind of the patriot.(25)

Rather than reforming their system the Turks became more oppressive of Armenians. Abdul Hamid II (the Red Sultan) armed the Kurds, and encouraged them to attack and spread havoc throughout the eastern provinces, particularly in the districts from which the Russian army had recently withdrawn. And, in 1891, the terror intensified by the formation of the notorious "Hamidiye" Cavalry corps. It was then obvious that the situation was getting out of hand, and in the 1890s, the Armenian revolutionary movement was already in full swing. Turkish oppression was to be matched by Armenian armed resistance.

IV. THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

As mentioned earlier, the Armenians hoped that European powers could intercede with the Sultan to introduce reforms for their protection. In fact, these powers were eager to find a stronghold of influence within the Empire and used the pretext of the suffering of Christians to advance their own interests.(26) Turkish reaction was harsh and severe, and consequently, the social and national repression of the Armenians took the most repugnant, shameful forms. The unchecked outrages perpetrated by the Sultans knew no bounds, and the Armenians constantly lived under threat of pogroms and slaughter.(27)

The first calls to resistance came from Armenian writers and intellectuals who addressed themselves to the plight of the Armenian peasants, and their continuous exodus from their fatherland. Michael Nalbandian, Khrimian Hairig, Raffi and

Servantziantz and many others began literary campaigns to focus national and international attention on the unbearable persecution suffered by the Armenian peasants in the Ottoman Empire.(28) However, in the latter part of the 19th Century, signs of resistance and outright insurrection appeared among the Armenians. Thus by the 1890s, internationally-based, structured secret societies were replacing earlier local defense groups. Turkish oppression was to be matched by Armenian armed resistance that drew its inspiration from Russian Socialists "Narodnaya Volia". But the effectiveness of this nascent revolutionary movement was no match for the Sultan's mechanisms of repression.

In the atmosphere of increasing tension between the Armenians and the Ottoman authorities, and as a result of the impact of the nationalist reawakening which swept through Europe at the end of the 19th Century, the years 1885-1890 saw the birth of the first Armenian political parties.

The first of the underground defense groups was the "Armenakan" party of Van 1885, which was followed by the Hunchaks in 1887 and the Dashnaks in 1890. The last two groups started their organizations in Geneva and Tiflis respectively. They were revolutionary socialist groups, drawing their inspiration from Russian revolutionary committees like the "Narodnaya Volia". During the early 1890s, the underground carried out few acts of armed defiance of Turkish authorities, and put up seditious placards calling on the people to revolt. At the time, the centers of revolutionary work were Zeitun, Van, and Erzeroum.

By 1885, the first group, Armenakan was fully developed. One of its founders was Mugurditch Portukalian who had been editor of Istanbul's "Armenia and Asia". The group was not organized as a national group, but only as a local group whose purpose was self-defense. Although unsuccessful in establishing a strong Armenian front, Portukalian's work was instrumental in

the formation of the first political party in the provinces. The purpose of this party was to win for the Armenians the right to self-determination. The party followed a policy of Armenian exclusiveness in party affairs because it believed that the inclusion of non-Armenians in the movement would only serve to dissipate energy and impede the progress of the Armenian revolution.

The Hunchakian society, the second group of Armenian underground, was the first significant organization of national influence. The name Hunchak, meaning "Bell", was taken from a political journal of that name. The group started its work in Geneva between 1887-1888, by Nazarbekian, one of the ideological fathers of the movement.

The intellectual orientation of the leadership was influenced to a great degree by the ideals of the Social Democratic revolutionaries as promulgated by the early Marxists and proto-Marxists. For this party, raising money and waging propaganda were formidable tasks in themselves, but the greatest problem lay in winning over the masses.

The Hunchakian Constitution gives some indication of the goals the party intended to pursue. The Hunchaks were:

- (a) To revolt and do away with all despotic regimes.
- (b) To deliver the Armenian people from their present state of slavery and to enable them to participate in political affairs.
- (c) To lift all barriers which hinder their economic progress and their cultural progress in general.
- (d) To create political conditions which will give the working class freedom to express its aspirations and demands, and to better the present dire working conditions in order to create class consciousness.
- (e) To organize the Armenians into a political body in order to facilitate the organization's social efforts

which must under all conditions help attain the remote aim.(29)

While the Hunchaks were interested in the liberation of Armenia, they were, and still are, also interested in the world revolution of Socialism and Communism. In addition, the Hunchaks were aware of the conflicting interests of the Armenian classes in Turkey. Thus, the party's immediate aim, as it was stated in its constitution, was to create a class consciousness among the peasantry. In fact, much of the Hunchaks' dialectic regarding the class struggle was alien and meaningless to the peasantry.(30) However, the Hunchaks were welcomed by the peasantry not because of any Marxist ideological interests but because the Hunchaks had weapons which Armenians needed for defense purposes and to continue the struggle against the oppressive Ottomans.

Another serious shortcoming of the Hunchaks was their administrative techniques. Article four of the constitution made it clear that the entire organization was to be rigidly centralized under executive control. Also, their policies were unclear because of ideological contradictions. There was always uncertainties about whether practice conformed to theory or not.

The third revolutionary group was the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, first known as the "Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries" and commonly referred to as the "Dashnaktzoutyoun" or simply the "Dashnaks". This group was the result of a merger of a number of Armenian groups, primarily in Russia, into a single political party. The leaders who were chiefly instrumental in bringing about this political unification during the summer of 1890 were the triumvirate Christopher Mikaelian (1859-1905), Stepan Zorian (Rostom or Kotot) (1867-1919), and Simon Zavarian (1866- 1913).(31) According to the Dashnak historian and statesman, Simon Vratzian, two crucial factors led to the formation of the Federation. One was the Giulizar incident and the other was the closing of the universities by the

Tzarist edict. At the end of 1889, Giulizar, an Armenian peasant girl of Moush, was kidnapped and raped by the Kurdish chief, Mousa Beg. At about the same time, in Russia, student demonstrations against the Tzarist regime led to a closing of the universities. This incident stirred the dissatisfaction of the Moscow Armenian students. These students had become identified with other revolutionaries (Russian and Georgian) who wished to overthrow the Tzarist regime. The nationalist students among these revolutionaries considered the freeing of Turkish Armenia as one of their main objectives and they had some spiritual influence upon the formation of the Federation.(32)

These three revolutionary groups just briefly discussed, were the genesis of later political groups which would operate as political parties. In its early development it was clear that the Caucasian-Armenian intelligentsia played a prominent role in the formation of the Armenian revolutionary movement both in Russia and in Turkey. The Hunchak and Dashnak parties were both formed by Russian Armenian intellectuals, and the ideological complexions of these and other Armenian parties were influenced by the ideological currents which had divided the Russian revolutionary movement.

Two principal factors affected the Armenian Revolutionary Movement. Its relation with other peoples of the Russian Empire, particularly the Russian Revolutionary Movement, and the question of the appropriateness of Socialism as program and goal for the Armenian political parties. These two factors were a constant source of tension within the Armenian revolutionary movement preventing any effective unity between its constituent parts.

By and large, these first nationalist stirrings intensified a Turkish sense of the potential threat posed by Armenian concentrations in the eastern part of the Empire. It is worth mentioning, that both the Turkish and Tzarist Russian governments were hardly enthusiastic over the rise of patriotism among Armenians. "Goaded by incessant demands from Europe that the Sultan press

"reforms" in the Armenian vilayets fearful of the increasing boldness of the suppressed nationalities of the Empire, the Sublime Porte reacted with characteristic ruthlessness".(33)

In 1894 some 10,000 Armenians were killed in Sassun. In 1895 around 100,000 Armenians were killed in Constantinople, Trebizond, Erzeroum, Marash, Sebastia, Van, Diyarbekir and other cities.(34) In Ourfa (historic Edessa) on Christmas Eve, the 3,000 Armenians who had taken shelter in the church were burned alive. However, 2,500 cities, towns and villages were destroyed, hundreds

of churches and monasteries were razed and more than 150,000 Armenians perished.(35) When the extent of the slaughter became known, the Turkish authorities offered as explanation that they were forced to put down a vast uprising. It is clear that these massacres were intended to intimidate the Armenians and discourage them from seeking the intercession of European powers, at the same time encouraging a demographic shift in favour of the Turkish population.(36)

The causes of the new massacres of 1894-1896, were mainly four, all of which had been present for years. There was first a traditional feeling of hostility among Muslim neighbors who believed they had the right to plunder Christians; secondly, Armenian enterpreneurship, thrift and ingenuity were responsible for the economic inequities separating them from others; no doubt Turks looked at Armenians enviously and suspiciously; thirdly, education had fostered in Armenians the desire to be free. Lastly, lesser incidents of persecutions had exacerbated conditions preceding the massacres and Armenians felt utterly helpless in view of the fact they could not obtain redress for their grievances. This destruction of Armenian life, stirred little comment in most countries. But in England and the United States, expressions of indignation at Turkish atrocities and sympathy for the suffering Armenians were evident in associational concern and the raising of relief funds.(37)

As the winter of 1895-1896 wore on, the massacre was followed by the general destitution of the Armenian population. In all the Armenian districts, survivors - chiefly widows and orphans - were in need of food, shelter, and raiment. Every time Armenians experienced a major calamity, their numbers were reduced and the 1895 massacres were no exception.

V. THE ARMENIAN NATIONALISTS AND THE "YOUNG TURKS"

Sultan Abdul Hamid's excesses and corrupt policies had alienated not only the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire, but also a sizeable proportion of the Turkish people. Armenian antipathy towards Abdul Hamid was shared by several other nationalities that conceived of the reigning Sultan as the major source of affliction.

In the 1860's and 1870's, a number of secret organizations, whose members were known as the "Young Turks", were formed to bring about fundamental reforms in the imperial system of Ottoman Turkey. The despotic rule of Abdul Hamid and later his failure to reform the system contributed to the appearance of these secret organizations.

One of these organizations was founded in 1865 by Namik Kemal, a Westernized Turk who advocated the Western concepts of fatherland, freedom and constitutional government. He proposed a new concept of citizenship to solve the problem of identity which was the natural consequence of an imperial system based on a multi-religious multi-racial population. At the time, the Ottoman Empire was beset by conflicts stemming from ethnic and national diversities. The concept was Pan-Ottomanism which Namik predicted would create a new national identity through a constitution, and would do away with the archaic "Millet" system. The basic objective was to rally the Empire's diverse population around the state in a common loyalty based upon non-racial, non-ethnic and non-religious identity. However, the Young Turk

movement was torn between two factions advocating different ideological positions which became more pronounced as the struggle against the Sultan intensified, especially among Ottoman subjects living outside the Empire.

One group of liberals, headed by Prince Sabaheddin, favored some measure of decentralization and autonomous rights for the religious and national minorities. The second group were the nationalists, headed by Ahmed Reza, who favored the establishment of a Turkish-dominated central system. This group was known as the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Terraki).(38) Prince Sabaheddin was sympathetic to the Armenian cause. In addition to advocating the overthrow of the oppressive, anti-Armenian regime of Abdul Hamid, he favored social reforms beneficial to minorities.(39) His support of administrative decentralization and his sincere desire for social harmony among the ethnic and religious groups was very appealing to the Armenians and the other minorities of the Empire.(40) The hope for some kind of a federal system attracted the Armenian nationalists who believed that autonomy might be an attainable solution for the Armenian problem.

Unfortunately, the nationalist faction in the Young Turk movement gained the upperhand. Secret Organizations were formed in the imperial armed forces, particularly among young officers in the army headquarters at Salonika, and they became part of the Committee of Union and Progress. This meant the officers were united with Reza's nationalist group.(41)

By early 1908 the center of gravity for the revolution had shifted from France to Macedonia where the army officers' discontent with the Sultan's regime was strong and growing. However, on July 23, 1908, the revolution took place and Abdul Hamid was deposed, and the 1876 Constitution was restored. According to Richard Peters, freedoms were assumed for the citizens of the empire: "With the victory of the revolution all the phantoms of the Hamid era vanished. Young Turkish commissars

occupied the Sultan's palace."(42) In this manner the Ottoman Empire was transformed into a constitutional monarchy, where human and individual rights were recognized and guaranteed.

The Armenians championed by the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), had taken an active role in the Young Turks revolt, with the hope that the Unionists would grant them equal rights with other Turks. As a gesture of good will, the ARF party called a halt to Armenian guerrilla activities in the eastern provinces, which it had instigated intermittently since 1895. But Armenian hopes were soon to be shattered, for "cooperation remained largely an empty letter, and revolutionary protests against lack of equality failed to strike a chord among the Muslim population of Turkey, while revolutionary reforms in the government system failed to obtain the support of Sultan Abdul Hamid himself."(43)

In April 1909, Abdul Hamid attempted a counter-coup to regain power with the assistance of the reactionary forces. But the Macedonian army reoccupied the capital and deposed the Sultan. On this occasion the Armenians came out as one of the staunchest supporters of the new regime. Even in spite of the Cilician massacres of 1909 (the Adana massacres), when more than 30,000 Armenians had been killed, the ARF continued to cooperate loyally with the Young Turk authorities.(44)

Unfortunately, the western educated elements in the "Ittihad ve Terraki" lost their influence to fanatics like Enver and Talaat, who were destined to become the founders of a racist regime. Turkish nationalism and racism together with gradual antagonism towards the non-Turkish elements of the Empire, neutralized and even erased the sense of Ottomanism. This tendency gave birth to a policy of Turkification by force and this in turn generated several revolts by the Druse, Arabs of Iraq and Palestine in 1910, Yemenites in 1911 and the Macedonians in 1912. The policy of Turkification was directed against the Arabs and in a more stressed manner against the Armenians

whose land geographically blocked the fulfillment of the Pan-Turanism dream.(45)

This philosophy of Pan-Turanism was detrimental to the Armenians who had hoped and struggled for the achievement of autonomy. However, the real intentions of the Young Turks became clear by 1910, when they finally abandoned both the idea of equality for all peoples of the Empire and their promise to grant local autonomy. By October, 1910, many Armenians came to believe that the CUP (Committee of Union Progress) had already made plans at a secret meeting in Salonika, for the extermination of the Armenian people.

The Armenian situation became terribly serious when beginning 1912 the triumvirate Enver, Talaat, Djemal emerged as the leaders of the Young Turks. As the situation became more serious, efforts to head off the catastrophe were made. In 1912 and 1913, various Armenian leaders, including the leader of the St Echmiadzin Church in Russian Armenia, requested help from the European powers. Specifically, they wanted a European commission to be empowered to supervise Armenian reforms in Turkey. Also, on January 8, 1913, the Russian government presented to the concerned powers a plan of reform, and, a year later, Turkey accepted the plan.

According to the plan the six Armenian vilayets were to be divided into areas, each having a European Inspector with guarantees of cultural and religious freedoms.(46)

For a while, it looked like the Armenians would finally be secure in Turkey. The two European inspectors were dispatched to Turkey. In April 1914, Westenek, chief of the provincial administration in the Dutch East Indies, and Major Hoff of the Norwegian Army arrived in Istanbul. In the Summer of 1914, Hoff arrived in Van while Westenek was awaiting departure to Erzeroum when World War I broke out. Turkey made the fatal mistake of joining Germany against the European democracies.

Once again, the Armenians missed their chance in obtaining autonomy, and in 1915, they were the target of the worst violence and brutality they had ever experienced. It was genocide and another brutal massacre of the Armenian people.

VI. ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND EXODUS

When World War I broke out the contest for Armenia's freedom had made considerable progress. Unfortunately, the Young Turks found it expedient to manipulate the Armenians in Turkey, as a culmination, they approached the ARF leadership and made a tactical proposition. To disintegrate the Russian forces in the Caucasus, the Young Turks thought of inciting an insurrection by the Tartars, Georgians and Armenians if Russia would fight on the side of the Allies, which it did. The Young Turks wanted the Armenians of Turkey to win over their kinsmen of the Caucasus and join the insurrection. In return for this service, they promised the Armenians "an autonomous state consisting of Kars, the province of Erivan, a part of Elizabetpol, the provinces of Van and Bitlis, and a fragment of the province of Erzerum".(47)

These propositions were submitted to the ARF which, in August of 1914, was holding its 9th convention in Erzeroum. The ARF categorically rejected the deal, and consequently had to suffer the tragedy of genocide in 1915. "This refusal, coupled with accusations of Armenian activities on behalf of Russia (at around the same time Armenians in Transcaucasia were publicly advocating the liberation of Turkish Armenia), prepared the ground for the events that would from then on be known as the 1915 massacre."(48)

Turkey's leaders, members of the "Ittihad ve Terakki" party, believed that, if the war was to end with an allied victory, Armenians would get their independence, along with the Arabs, and the Empire would be completely dismembered. A Turkish intellectual and politician Mevlan Zadi Rifaat, reports what Dr Nazem, Secretary General of the "Ittihad" party, told the

Central Committee at a meeting:

"Now we are at war; there is no better opportunity than this, the intervention of great countries and the protests of newspapers cannot be heard; even if they are heard, the matter will become an accomplished fact and will be over. This timely operation must be one of annihilation. It is necessary to exterminate all Armenians and not leave one alive."(49)

There is incontrovertible evidence that the plan of extermination was conceived and meticulously carried out by Turkish government orders. Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador in Istanbul at the time, records in his memoirs countless conversations with Talaat, Enver and Gemal, as well as with German officials in Turkey that indicate clearly that the plan for massacre was developed years before the war and was executed as an official act of Turkish government. Morgenthau writes:

"The conditions of the War gave to the Turkish government its longed-for opportunity to lay hold of the Armenians. At the very beginning they sent for some of the Armenian leaders and notified them that, if any Armenians should render the slightest assistance to the Russians when they invaded Turkey, they would not stop to investigate but would punish the entire race for it." "During the Spring of 1914 they evolved their plan to destroy the Armenian race. They criticized their ancestors for neglecting to destroy or convert the Christian races to Mohammedanism of the time when they first subjugated them. Now, as four of the Great Powers were at war with them and the two others were their allies, they thought the time opportune to make good the oversight of their ancestors in the fifteenth century. They concluded that, once they had carried out their plan, the Great Powers would find themselves before an accomplished fact and that their crime would be condoned, as was done in the case of massacres of 1895-1896, when the Great Powers did not even reprimand the Sultan."(50)

Moreover, a conscience-stricken Turkish official, Naim Bey, in his own memoirs, provides ample evidence of the official

responsibility. Order No. 691 to the Governor of Aleppo, November 23, 1915: "Destroy by secret means the Armenians of the Eastern provinces who pass into your hands there."(51)

s - Minister of Interior,
Talaat

Order No, 830, December 25, 1915:

"Collect and keep only orphans who cannot remember the tortures to which their parents have been subjected. Send the rest away with the caravans."

s - Minister of Interior,
Talaat

Order to the Governor of Aleppo, September 16, 1915:

"It was at first communicated to you that the Government, by order of the Jemiet (Committee of Union and Progress), had decided to destroy in Turkey. Those who oppose this order and decision cannot remain on the official staff of the Empire. An end must be put to their existence, however criminal the massacre taken may be, and no regard must be paid to either age or sex or conscientious scruples."

s - Minister of Interior,
Talaat

Arnold Toynbee, the noted historian, gave the following account of what was happening:

"The Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire were everywhere uprooted from their homes and deported to the most remote and unhealthy districts that the government could select for them. Some were murdered at the outset, some perished on the way and some died after reaching their destination."

Fridtjof Nansen, High Commissioner for Refugees under the League of Nations, writes in his "Armenia and the Near East" (1926):

"Then, in June 1915, the horrors began to which we know no parallel in history. From all the villages and towns of Cilicia, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia the Armenian Christians were driven forth on their death march; the work was done systematically, clearing out one district after another, whether the population happened to be near the scene of war or hundreds of kilometers away from it. There was to be a clean sweep of all Armenians."

Baron von Wangenheim, German Ambassador in Constantinople, in a report to the German Chancellor dated July 17, 1915, writes:

"It is obvious that the banishment of the Armenians is due not solely to military consideration. Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior, has quite frankly said to Dr Mordtman of the Embassy, that the Turkish government intended to make use of the World War and deal thoroughly with its internal enemies, the Christians in Turkey, and that it meant not to be disturbed in this by diplomatic intervention from abroad."

A telegram by Prince Hohenlohe of the German Embassy in Constantinople to the German Consulate in Aleppo, on August 2, 1915, reads:

"In its attempt to carry out its purpose to resolve the Armenian question by the destruction of the Armenian race, the Turkish government has refused to be deterred neither by our representations nor by those of the American Embassy, nor by the delegate of the Pope, nor by the threats of the Allied Powers, nor in deference to the public opinion of the West representing one-half of the world."

Von Scheubner-Richter, the German Consul in Erzeroum, in a report dated December 4, 1916, stated:

"A great part of the Young Turkish Committee seems to take the point of view that the Turkish Empire can only be built upon a purely Mohammedan pan-Turkish foundation. The population which is neither one nor the other must either become Turkish and Mohammedan or must be completely destroyed."

However, the decision taken in secret meetings of the ruling Party of Union and Progress, "the consular reports of the period,

the voluminous depositions of eye-witnesses, the writings of war correspondents and historians, the evidence of those who escaped miraculously the massacres and finally the evidence provided by the Turks themselves before the Military Tribunal set up after the war in Istanbul to try the Turkish criminals, as reported in "Takvime Vakaye" (Turkish official journal) of 1919, give us abundant proof that massacres and deportations were part of a master-plan, the purpose of which was nothing less than the extermination of the Armenians in Turkish occupied Armenia and elsewhere within the Ottoman Empire and the final elimination of the Armenian problem."(52)

The result was that more than million and a half Armenians, died a violent death, in culmination to massacres, deportations, torture and starvation. According to Howard M Sachar:

"By any standards this was surely the most unprecedented, indeed the most unimaginable racial annihilation, untill then, in modern history. Nevertheless, apparently unconcerned by the enormity of their affront to civilization, the members of the Young Turk regime continued to view the deportations as nothing more than effective diplomacy, the realization of Abdul Hamid's injunction that the best way to finish with the Armenian Question is to finish with the Armenians!"(53)

Furthermore, all the property of the Armenians, movable and immovable, private and communal, was subjected to illegal seizure.

VII. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Deportations and massacres quickly turned the Armenians against the Turkish state to which they were loyal at the beginning of the war. The Armenians fought on the side of the allies, with the hope that the latter would fulfill their promise of creating a unified Independent Armenia after the defeat of Turkey.(54)

On November 15, 1917, in a government decree, the Soviet Union declared the principle of self-determination as a right

belonging to all peoples. On the 30th of the same month, Lenin and Stalin made a declaration recognizing the independence of Western Armenia from Turkish yoke, and suggesting the formation of a democratic Armenian government. On the 8th of January 1918, Woodrow Wilson, the United States president made a similar declaration with regard to peoples oppressed by Turkey, particularly the Armenians. These declarations provided more momentum for the Armenians to carry on the struggle with greater determination.(55) Consequently, the Armenian troops defeated the Turks in three major encounters at Sardarapat, Bash Abaran and Karakilisseh; which forced Turkey to sue for peace and on May 28, 1918, an independent Armenian Republic in the Caucasus, ie, in formerly Russian Armenia, was declared.

It is important to note, that the Armenians had inherited nothing from the Russian Empire. There was no organized administrative machinery, no capital, no means of transportation, no trained experts for the three branches of government.(56) Kachaznuni, the first Premier of Armenia, in his maiden speech before the Parliament, described the situation in the following words:

"The Government has not one connecting link with the past. It has not succeeded to a former government so that it could continue its labors. It has inherited no administrative machinery. It has to start from scratch. It must create everything from a heap of ruins and absolute chaos. The Government has found the country in a condition which best can be described by one word - Catastrophic."(57)

As soon as the war ended, Armenia commenced her rapid regeneration. The Turkish troops vacated their occupied positions and the boundaries of Armenia were enlarged somewhat. In June 1919, elections were held in Armenia. Six political parties participated and eighty members of parliament were elected, 72 of them were ARF (Dashnak) candidates.

The Armenian Republic organized a central government with an army police force, judicial system and school. It created an

Armenian Red Cross and established diplomatic relationships with other countries.

On January 19, 1920, the Allied Supreme Council recognized Armenia's independence and her de facto government. The Armenian Republic was recognized by the United States Government in a communication addressed by the secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, to the Armenian Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, Dr Armen Garo Pasdermadjian, April 23, 1920.(58)

In April 1920, the san Remo conference proposed that the United States accept an Armenian mandate, and that, whatever the United States decision, President Wilson define the frontiers of the Armenian State and that the treaty with Turkey should designate him as a referee in the question of the Turkish Armenian frontiers.(59) Meanwhile, on April 23, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk established his rebel "Provisional Government" in Ankara in defence of the Western Powers, and, in Cilicia, Kemalists massacred more than 30,000 Armenians.

The peace treaty with Turkey, delayed for sixteen months, was finally signed at Sevres on August 10, 1920. It was during this interval of sixteen months that the nationalist movement of Mustafa Kamal, actively supported by France, Italy, and the Soviet Russia, became a power to contend with. The Republic of Armenia was represented at Sevres conference and was a signatory of the treaty through its delegation, headed by Avedis Aharonian. This treaty granted international recognition to Armenian independence, albeit it was devoid of any practical significance. The Kemalist movement, vitalized by the mutual rivalries of the powers and with the active Soviet Support, not only killed it, but Frustrated all the Allied plans concerning the near East.

On September 22, 1920, Turkish regular troops attacked the Republic of Armenia from the south and the south-west, while the Bolshevich Russians threatened it from the north-east. After

several weeks of fighting, the Armenians succumbed and finally were defeated. However, when, on November 20, 1920, President Wilson officially set forth the territorial limits of the new Armenian State, the collapse of the Republic was only a few days off. The Vilayets of Kars and Ardahan were retaken by Turkey (treaty of Alexandropol) and what remained of Armenia (approximately 30,000 sq Km) became Soviet on December 2, 1920.

On February 18, 1921, the ARF, in reprisal, incited a spontaneous revolt which drove the Red Army out of Armenia. However, by July 21, the Soviet Red Army had staged a comeback and reconquered Armenia. Consequently, the ARF was outlawed and its leadership left to assume from the direction of the fight for freedom. The February 18 Armenian Revolt was the last military act of the second phase of the Age of Armenian Revolution.

The European powers and the United States of America turned away from the miserable Armenians and the Armenian question. They forgot what American Major General James G Harbord, after his return from the Armenian provinces in 1919, had called the "most crime of all the ages", and bowed to political, economic and military expediency in the "Black Treaty of Lausanne" in 1923, in which Armenia or the Armenians were no longer mentioned.(60)

It is worth mentioning, that the Delegations of the Armenian Republic which had been excluded from the Lausanne Conference on this occasion lodged the following protest:

"The delegation which signed the Sevres Treaty for Armenia reserves and insists upon all the rights which the Powers, during and since the war, solemnly recognized and which were duly embodied in the Sevres Treaty, and reincorporated and reaffirmed by the decisions of subsequent conferences. Whatever reception a solemn protest may have at this time, the Delegation, by virtue of the mandate which it holds from the Armenian people is impelled by a clear sense of duty to denounce respectfully the act of Lausanne. It leaves the verdict to history."(61)

The Treaty of Lausanne was perceived by many European high ranking officials and diplomats, as an outright betrayal of the Armenian cause. To many of them, this treaty had relegated the Armenian Question to the category of unsolved matters. However, leading comments on the Treaty of Lausanne were made by David Lloyd George in a speech in London, July 25, 1923, reproduced in this book entitled "Is it Peace?" The following is a small part of his speech:

" . . . No one claims that this treaty is peace with honour. It is not even peace. If one were dealing with a regenerated Turk, then there might be hope. But the burning of Smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders of tens of thousands of Young Greeks in the interior, prove that the Turk is still unchanged . . ."

James W Gerard, former American Ambassador to Germany, in an article entitled "The Senate and the Lausanne Treaty", quoted in The New Armenia, September-October 1923, writes in part:

" . . . By signing the Lausanne Treaty, we abdicated the high moral position which we had heretofore occupied in the Near East and fell into the category of petty concession hunters. By this act, we have cast serious reflection upon the motives of the men and women we send to the four corners of earth as missionaries of American ideas and ideals; and we have discredited our profession of disinterestedness and altruism in our dealing with dependent nations . . ."

Moreover, the Democratic National Platform, June 24, 1924, stated the following in its address:

"We condemn the Lausanne Treaty. It barter legitimate American rights and betrays Armenia for the Chester oil concession. We favor the protection of American rights in Turkey and the fulfillment of President Wilson's arbitral award respecting Armenia."

Winston Churchill wrote, "History will vainly seek the name of Armenia in the Treaty of Lausanne".(62) It was said that England again sold Armenia for the sake of Mossul. "Oil weighed thicker than Armenian blood," said Lord Curzon.

In spite of the betrayal of the Armenian Question by the States at Lausanne, in spite of the fact that efforts at positive intervention in the League of Nations by friendly countries like Greece and Rumania remained futile (64), it is an irrefutable fact that the Armenian Question exists, has remained unsolved, and therefore it awaits a solution.

VIII. THE SOVIET REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

As we mentioned earlier, the Armenians had been able to establish a truncated republic in 1918-1920, in part of what was formerly Russian Armenia situated in the Southwestern Caucasus. It was governed by a coalition of Armenian Nationalist parties led by the Dashnaks (The Armenian Revolutionary Federation). The internal situation in the new republic was precarious at best. An area that had imported one-third of its food before the war was now supporting a 50 percent increase in population, mostly made up of Armenian refugees from Turkey. Only the American Relief Mission between 1919 and 1920 prevented a major famine.

The Sovietization of parts of Armenia was brought about predominantly as a result of external forces and circumstances. However, it would be an inadmissible error to disregard the role played by the local Armenian communists, though these comunists were limited in number. The events leading to the establishment of Soviet Armenia began in the summer of 1919. The Bolsheviks were then diligently organizing communist cells and making declarations and statements in the press and through the distribution of leaflets exhorting the people to rally around communism and fight the Dashnaks. Soviet assistance to local communists was important because if the Armenian communists were left to their own resources they would not have been able to overthrow the government of the republic. When the Armenian communists established themselves in "Erevan", they imprisoned

and shot many Dashnak leaders. As mentioned earlier, on February 18, 1921, the Dashnaks organized a rebellion which successfully overthrew the Soviet regime in "Erevan", the Red Army cruelly suppressed it. Ever since that time the Dashnaks have remained the center of Armenian opposition to the Soviet regime, especially among the Armenians of the Diaspora.

The territory which went under Soviet communist control was even smaller than the tiny state of the Armenian Republic of 1918-1920, and extended only to one-tenth of historical "Great Armenia". Kars, Ardahan and Igdir were, by 1921, already firmly in Turkish hands.

Initially, Stalin merged the Armenian territory under Soviet control with Georgia and Azerbaijan to form a single Transcaucasian federation. This he did to wipe out local opposition and the arrangement continued until the local leadership had been thoroughly urged by the firing squad and deportations to Siberia.

An important element in the resurgence of Armenian culture and identity under Soviet rule is the fact that Armenian is the first official language of the republic, along with Russian. The only region of the world where official business is primarily conducted in the Armenian vernacular is Soviet Armenia. In addition, it has a first-rate public education system. In 1935, an Armenian branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences was founded, and promoted to the status of an independent academy in 1943.

The cultural and economic resurgence of Soviet Armenia provoked sharp dissensions among the Armenians of the diaspora, particularly between World War I and World War II. Old Dashnaks regarded the Soviet Union as the arch-enemy, surpassed in wickedness only by the Turks. Many others came to see Soviet Armenia as the only remaining ingredient of genuine nationality and the only hope for the survival of Armenian identity and its national ethos. The diaspora, they believed, was vulnerable to

alien influences and therefore could not ultimately preserve the pure essence of Armenian culture, identity, and nationality.

In a sense politics in Soviet Armenia is a reflection of the dialectics of nationalism in the Soviet Union. Basically, Soviet Armenians have historical claim to two pieces of territory now part of the Azerbaijan SSR - the Karabagh Autonomous Oblast and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet-Socialist Republic. The Armenians' claim to Karabagh in which they contribute 85 percent of its population and to Nakhichevan is based on legal formulations including a series of solemn promises and declarations made during the years 1920 and 1921 by leading official Bolshevik personalities.(67) The initial pronouncement was made on December 1st 1920 by N N Narimanov, who, on behalf of the Azerbaijan SSR, officially yielded these territories to "the brotherly Soviet Armenian Republic".(68) However, in less than three months, the Soviet Union concluded the Moscow Treaty with Kemalist Turkey according to which Nakhichevan was made an autonomous territory within the Azerbaijan SSR. Today, Armenians, particularly those in the Armenian SSR, still contest the decision and occasionally Armenians insistence upon the territory's return to their control, causes vibrations in Soviet-Armenian and Azerbaijani-Armenian relations.

However, Soviet policy has always opposed political dissension and expressions of nationalist priorities. Often the measures taken against such tendencies were harsh and excessive. Even Armenian dislike of the Turks could not be allowed to disrupt Soviet-Turkish relations, especially when these relations were deliberately arranged to be friendly and cordial. Thus, as recently as 1965, when Armenians demonstrated against what they considered to be the usurpation of their territorial rights by Turkey (particularly the six vilayets) the Soviet Union quelled the ensuing unrest and proceeded to oust Y Zarobian, the Secretary-General of the Armenian Communist Party (ACP). They replaced him with A Kochinyan. Armenian resentment spread to affect the nonpolitical elements of Armenian society.

For instance, the Fifth Writers' Congress of November 1966 demanded from the government:

- 1) Official recognition of 24 April as a day of National mourning to be observed every year;
- 2) The return of the Moscow Armenian cultural building which had been confiscated by Beria and permission to re-open it as a cultural center for Armenians living in the Soviet capital;
- 3) The proper observation and celebration of anniversaries of certain "national figures" who had contributed to Armenian literature and culture early in the nation's history.(69)

Despite these occasional grievances, the Armenians know that they depend politically and economically on Moscow and their underlying loyalty towards the Soviet Union is beyond doubt. However, the recent upheavals in the "Nagorno Karabagh" region have stirred the nationality problem in the Soviet Union and have put Gorbachev's "Perestroika" and "Glasnost" policies to the fore of Soviet politics.

To understand the current conflict over the "Karabagh" enclave, it is important to trace its historic roots in the light of Leninist-Stalinist Soviet Nationality policy. The "Karabagh Question", however, continues to exacerbate the relations of Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan and poses the problem of nationalist claims over disputed territories to the Soviet government.

Despite the negative decision made recently by the Politbureau and endorsed by the Secretary-General of the Communist party Mr Michail Gorbachev, in regard to the retaining of the "Karabagh" enclave under the Azerbaijan jurisdiction, the Armenians in the Soviet Union and the Diaspora are still fighting to reverse the decision.

IX. THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE QUESTION OF "NAGORNO KARABAGH"

The one hundred and thirty-one nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union are officially assured that the "national problem", ie the inequality problem in the socio-economic and political spheres inherited from the Tsarist Empire, has been solved by the application of the Leninist "nationality policy".(70) Lenin viewed "Nationalism as a by-product of the capitalist mode of production doomed to disappear with the introduction of socialism".(71) Being aware of the explosive force of nationalism, prompted Lenin to formulate a radical programmatic solution while living in Austria at the brink of World War I. However, this solution was "political self-determination, defined to mean that every national minority had the right to separate and form an independent state; if it did not wish to avail itself of this right, it had to acquiesce to assimilation".(72)

It is important to note, that since its inception the Soviet Union has been a strictly centralized state ruled by the Communist party. Despite its own centralization, the party recognizes constitutionally the Union Republics, which in theory are able to separate and form independent, sovereign states.(73) However, in reality the Soviet Union is unitary, and in form federal.(74)

Lenin and other leaders of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, believed that nationalism is a part of the "social superstructure at the capitalist stage of historical development", would be replaced by a new "inter-nationalist proletarian consciousness" free of nationalist elements once socialism is accomplished. Consequently, the formula which called for a political system "national in form and socialist in content", became the cornerstone of the Soviet nationality policy. In fact, the above mentioned formula meant that each "national group is granted the right to its own 'national form' (autonomous units constitutionally, language and media of expression culturally), but only

on condition that it be filled with a uniform 'socialist content' determined by the CPSU".(75) In form, the nationality policy is designed to allow the Soviet nationalities a harmless outlet for their national aspirations, however, in essence it preserves the locus of power for the central organs of the party and the government.(76)

The Soviet Union is a multi-ethnic society, with the Russians constituting a ruling majority. Ethnicity, which is the major dynamic force of change, is fully incorporated into the federal state structure along the postulates of class-based "Internationalism".(77) Ethnic conflict and antagonisms are not new phenomena in Soviet culture, they have always been present since Russia's colonial past; however, growing ethnic self-assertion by non-Russian minorities became more visible and vociferous under "the impact of modernization and the development of ethnic cultures".(78)

"Perestroika" and "Glasnost", two key concepts, had been dynamic in initiating social and economic changes within the substructure and superstructure of Soviet society. These concepts had always been present in the dictionary of Russian development and modernization, however, in recent years they have been greatly emphasized to rebuild the new Soviet man and society. In particular, the purpose of "Perestroika", as has been described by Michail Gorbachev at the jubilee meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to mark the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, on November 2, 1987, stated the following:

" . . . the purpose of perestroika is the full theoretical and practical reestablishment of Lenin's conception of socialism, in which indisputable priority belongs to the working man with his ideals and interests, to humanitarian values in the economy, in social and political relations, and in culture . . . The democratisation of society is at the core of perestroika, and on its progress depends the

success of perestroika itself and the future of socialism in general."(79)

From the above statement, one can infer, that in order for "Perestroika" to succeed, two key problems should be fully addressed. These are the democratisation of all social life and a radical economic reform, which would prompt the Soviet people for genuine involvement in the decision-making process and in public matters. However, social transformation along the lines of social flexibility and tolerance of ethnic divergence, could sift the cognitions and perceptions of the multi-ethnic society towards the acceptance of new modes of political culture based on social democracy and the decentralization of power.

The preservation of language and culture by the various national minorities in the Soviet Union, has exacerbated ethnic strife, that occasionally poses serious threats to the central government in Moscow. It is evident that recently "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" have been instrumental in paving the way for national minorities to press for socio-economic and geopolitical reforms, and the "Karabagh" claim by the Armenians has set a good precedent in that direction.

It is not the aim of this study to analyze the dialectics of nationalism in the USSR, however, the main emphasis will be on the "Armeno-Azerbaijani" conflict that manifested itself in violent forms. Yet, it would be an admissible error, if one overlooks the current impact of ongoing change on the dual "national in form - socialist in content" framework of the Soviet state, that has been incrementally "losing its functionality in the area it was meant to revolve, namely, that of ethnic relations."(80) According to Teresa Rakowski Harmstone, a leading authority on ethnicity in the Soviet Union, ". . . Instead of an expected union-wide intergration it has stimulated the forces of ethnicity, the containment of which is proving increasingly difficult."(81) In fact, there is no ethnic warfare or open separatism except for the recent "Armeno-Azerbaijani" clashes. Basically, "ethnic forces press for an evolution toward greater autonomy, but if it is

denied, there may be a real explosion,"(82) and the conflict over the "Nagorno Karabagh" enclave is a stepping stone in that direction.

X. THE ORIGINS OF THE BOUNDARY FEUDS

To understand the origin of the boundary feuds, it is important to briefly describe the Transcaucasian Armenian Irredenta to which the Armenians lay ethnographic, geographic and economic claim. These are the districts of:

- a) "Nakhitchevan": a protectorate of Azerbaijan,
- b) "Karabagh": an autonomous district under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, and
- c) "Akhalkalak": a protectorate of Georgia.

The total area of the Transcaucasian Armenian Irredenta would be 7,220 square miles.(83)

On the other hand, the Turkish Irredenta contiguous with Armenia but with an entirely different status from the Turkish Armenian provinces, includes the following districts: a) Kars, b) Kaghzvan (Kagisman), c) Surmalu (Igdir), d) Ardahan, and e) Olti, with a total area of 8,044 square miles.(84)

However, the "Wilsonian boundary" gave to Armenia the following provinces: a) Van, b) Bitlis, c) Erzeroum, and d) Trebizond, with a total area of 34,750 square miles.(85)

It is important to note, that the "Wilsonian Award" and the Turkish Irredenta were cancelled in culmination to several treaties: Brest-Litovsk, Moscow, Kars and finally, the Treaty of Lausanne 1923.

In the light of the recent "Armeno-Azerbaijani" conflict the question of mountainous "Karabagh" deserves special attention, simply because it revived the national minorities issue in the Soviet Union, that has been dormant for several decades. In fact, it brought to the fore of Russian politics, conflicting territorial claims in the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan that could not be solved by negotiation or compromise. Besides, the recent upsurge of Armenian

nationalism is enhancing other republics, like Lithuania and Estonia, to press for more political and economic reforms from the Soviet Union.

Definitely, this wave of nationalism is posing great threats to Gorbachev's "Perestroika" and "Glasnost" policies, that could be well manipulated by Gorbachev's political opposition within the CPSU. However, the handling of this delicate situation by Gorbachev will be the real test of his power, yet to be perceived.

The historic background to the "Nagorno Karabagh" conflict, goes back to the spring of 1918, when the Transcaucasian federation (Seym) was dissolved and the three constituent nations - the Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis - proclaimed their independence at a time when the Caucasus was geopolitically in shambles. According to James G Mandalian, a noted Armenian historian, who described best the political situation in that region:

"... After disastrous offensives and counter-offensives Turkish troops still occupied certain regions which, by the terms of the treaties, were to be evacuated. Their evacuation and the withdrawal of the Russian armies at the behest of the Soviets created a vacuum which instantly provoked a general scramble among the three Caucasian nations to fill the void. These conflicts centered around the mixed populated and in some instances heavily Armenian populated regions of Lori, Borchalu, Akhalkalak, Nakhitchevan, Zangezur, Gandsak and Karabagh . . ." (86)

Consequently, endless insurrections, local fights, Allied interventions, open wars and finally, international negotiating conferences culminated in the despoliation of Armenia among the Turks, the Soviets and their Caucasian neighbors. "Akalkalak", with a population of 80,000 Armenians, was officially annexed to Georgia, while "Nakhitchevan", "Karabagh" and "Zangezur" were given the status of autonomous districts under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. However, the story of "Nagorno Karabagh" goes deeper than this.

XI. THE ISSUE OF "NAGORNO KARABAGH": SOME HISTORICAL NOTES

The district of "Nagorno Karabagh" situated to the north-east of Armenia, with its geographic location, natural assets, and ethnographic preponderance, constitutes the immediate continuation of the Armenian plateau. The mountainous "Karabagh" is comprised of several regions:

a) Shoushi, b) Chivanshir, c) Chiprail-Kachen, d) Varanda, e) Dizak, and f) Chaberd, that are predominantly Armenian in population.(87)

According to Artin H Arslanian, an Armenian historian,

"... Britain, which occupied Transcaucasia after World War I, played a leading role in the struggle for Karabagh and for a resolution favouring Azerbaijan. The settlement reached in the summer of 1919 remained basically unchanged after the Red Army took control of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920 . . ."(88)

However, when British military troops occupied strategic points in Transcaucasia, the Armenians were enthusiastic and happy in the beginning. Yet, after a brief period General Thomson - the leading British commander in the Caucasus - and especially his successor Colonel Digby Inglis Shuttleworth, favoured Azerbaijan's claims to the districts of "Karabagh" and "Zangezur" and requested that the majority of Armenian inhabitants accept the provisional jurisdiction of Fathali Kham Khoiskii's government.(89) The rationale behind this British policy lay in the fact that, as "rulers of an extensive colonial empire that included millions of Muslim subjects, the British stood to gain widespread good will for supporting the first Muslim republic in modern history."(90) Adding insult to the shattered hopes of Armenians, Thomson furthermore, approved the Azerbaijani government's choice of Doctor Khosrov Bek Sultanov, a notorious Armenophobe, as the governor general of the two regions, "Karabagh" and "Zangezur".(91) This pro-Azerbaijan British policy, shocked the Armenians, who considered themselves

the "Little Ally". Consequently,

" . . . as proof to this claim they (Armenians) pointed to their resistance against the Turks during the World War and to numerous Allied wartime pledges on their behalf. Thus, they expected the British forces to assist them in incorporating into the Armenian republic the territories disputed with Azerbaijan whose government had co-operated with the Turks during the war."(92)

The Armenians contested the British decision on the basis of the principle of the self-determination of nationalities, as well as on economic, geographic and historical considerations. British response fell on deaf ears, and as a result, Azerbaijani troops, in cooperation with the Kurdish irregulars, entered Shushi in early June, 1919. Hundreds of Armenians were massacred and many of their villages were looted and destroyed.

Several critics of British policies in the Caucasus singled out economic exploitation - the reserve oil at Baku - as the prime determinant in British policy, not to mention, "access to this wealth would naturally be facilitated through the cooperation of an appreciative, indebted local government . . ." (93) "Whether or not 'oil imperialism' dictated British policy in the Caucasus, economic factors could not have been ignored". (94) At the time, British policy toward "Karabagh" aroused great indignation in the Republic of Armenia. According to Lieutenant-Colonel John C Plowden, the British military representative in Erevan, reported at the end of August 1919:

"The handing over of Karabagh to Azerbaijan was, I think, the bitterest blow of all. Karabagh means more to the Armenians than their religion even, being the cradle of their race, and their traditional last sanctuary when their country has been invaded. It is Armenian in every particular and the strongest part of Armenia, both financially, militarily and socially . . ." (95)

The Armenians realized that their cause had been betrayed by the British, whom at the beginning, were perceived as a natural ally. Armenian petitions to the Foreign Office in London and to the British Peace Delegation in Paris proved to be

unproductive. Moreover, it so happened that both Kemalists Turkey and Soviet Russia, from different motives, were waging war against the British who withdrew the bulk of their troops from Transcaucasia in the summer of 1919. This convergence of mutual interest incidentally benefited the Azerbaijani cause.(96) According to Arslanian,

"The struggle for Karabagh, however, did not end with the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1920. Mountainous Karabagh remained an autonomous region in Soviet Azerbaijan contrary to declarations by Stalin and the Soviet government of Azerbaijan in December 1920 that it would be ceded to Armenia."(97)

It was the Treaty of Moscow, March 16, 1921, between the Soviets and Kemalists Turkey which formalized the latter's seizure of the districts of Kars, Ardahan, Surmalu and Olti, along with the cession of Karabagh and Nakhitchevan to Azerbaijan and the remainder of the Western Strip was labelled "Soviet Armenia", which was taken over by the Soviets of Russia. Henceforth, mountainous "Karabagh", which has no connection with Azerbaijan, was forcibly taken from Armenia by the Soviets, and was turned over to Azerbaijan, for a rapprochement with Turkey.

XII. THE RECENT REVIVAL OF THE "KARABAGH" ISSUE

Armenians in Soviet Armenia, never gave up on their territorial claims to the enclaves of "Karabagh", "Nakhitchevan" and "Zangezur". In recent years the Karabagh Armenians have been vociferous in their demands, and in letters to the Central Committee of the Communist party, as well as to Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev, they have demanded the incorporation of "Karabagh" into Armenia. The contents of these letters reiterated the accusation of the Azerbaijani authorities in pursuing cultural and economic repression towards "Karabagh" Armenians. Moreover, emphasis was made on Azerbaijani control over "Karabagh" which contradicts the spirit of Lenin's policy on nationalities.(98)

There has been an upsurge in nationalist tendencies during the three years since Gorbachev came to power and launched his liberalization campaign. However, the recent Armenian protests in Soviet Armenia, (February, 1988) faced Gorbachev with one of his most serious challenges since taking office. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev managed to damp down an outburst of Armenian nationalists in February 1988, by agreeing to conduct a top level review of local grievances, however, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet passed a resolution favouring the "status quo". Armenian activists responded by threatening to call a general strike. According to the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov:

"... the atmosphere was quite tense in Nagorno Karabagh. Armenian nationalists have pressured since 1923 for annexation of the area, which is about the size of the island of Crete. Azerbaijanis opposed to yielding the territory took out their resentment last February by attacking Armenians in the city of Sumgait. Official accounts placed the death toll from the violence at 32 . . . and left 197 injured, including 100 policemen, and that several cases of rape were reported . . ." (99)

In tacit recognition to the validity of the Armenian grievances, the Presidium recommended an eight year program of cultural and economic development for "Nagorno-Karabagh". The plan emphasized the construction of schools, hospitals and infrastructure projects. On the issue of the "Nagorno-Karabagh" nationalist campaign, however, the Presidium was adamant to a firm "Nyet", because any concession to the Armenians might prompt similar demands from others among the Soviet Union's 100 nationality groups. (100)

In response to the Presidium's decision, the Armenian Supreme Soviet, or Parliament, voted in mid June 1988, in "favour of annexing 'Nagorno-Karabagh', thus contradicting the position taken in March 1988, by Moscow party leaders". The vote also put the Armenian leaders in conflict with Azerbaijan's authorities, which had decided not to relinquish control of "Nagorno-Karabagh". (101) Giving in to the Armenian demands by redrawing internal boundaries would set a potentially

troublesome precedent for the Kremlin's dealings with other nationalities.(102)

Albeit, the upheaval is neither anti-Soviet nor anti-Communist, it could pose a threat to Gorbachev's position if it remains unsolved. According to an article published in the Komsomolskaya Pravda, "what is happening around Nagorno-Karabagh is a blow to Perestroika, possibly the most serious blow in recent times . . . this is a challenge to the ideals of glasnost, a chance for conservatives to strengthen their point of view".(103)

Gorbachev demonstrated less patience with the problem of nationalist unrest, ie the "Armeno-Azerbaijani" conflict. While praising the "growth of ethnic self-awareness" he cautioned that "any obsession with national isolation can only lead to economic and cultural impoverishment. Nationalist "collisions", he said, must be settled "within the existing state structure of our Union", a reference to the roiling secessionist movement in the autonomous region of Nagorno Karabagh, an area that is geographically part of Azerbaijan but ethnically 75% Armenian".(104)

Gorbachev's approach to the "Armeno-Azerbaijani" conflict was characterized with prudence and cautiousness, for it was described by one speaker at the latest Supreme Soviet meeting, "a landmine under Perestroika". Moreover, Mr Gorbachev added, "we must not allow one nation to feel insulted. We must not allow any increase of tensions between them, or let it go to extremes."(105) Western experts on the Soviet Union generally agree that Gorbachev's policies of economic restructuring and political openness are feeding the centrifugal forces of nationalism. For Gorbachev the Armenian crisis has revealed how shallow party control can be once people's passions are aroused. In fact, it is puzzling why the Soviet leadership worries about a regional crisis, since the Armenians want "Nagorno Karabagh's" independence from Azerbaijan, and not from the Soviet Union. Besides, Armenians never manifested anti-Russian or anti-Soviet feelings, they simply raised a slogan for change to join Armenia proper. This simple Armenian feeling has transcended to a

national issue that has given it a certain legitimacy.

Given the socio-political and economic realities in the Soviet Union, Western experts anticipate continued growth of national awareness among the Soviet minorities that would pose greater challenges to the ruling elite in Moscow. However, the "Armeno-Azerbaijani" conflict portrayed increasing disruptiveness, but not necessarily destructiveness of the existing political system. Moreover, given the regional and geopolitical boundaries of the various 131 nationalities in the Soviet Union, the chances of the Armenians to regain control over "Karabagh" is grim. One might argue that the violent demonstrations went beyond the expectations of the party leaders in Armenia and Moscow respectively. Furthermore, they represented to Moscow an alarming manifestation of the kind of nationalist fervor that could easily develop anti-Russian overtones, if the minorities issue is not settled.

XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Most Armenians refer to the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August, 1920, as a ground for territorial claims, because Armenia in (Article 88) was recognized as a free and independent State. This treaty made the Armenian claim historically valid, with an international juridical credit. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Sevres was never implemented, and as a matter of fact, Kemalist Turkey soon repudiated it, and the Allied nations were impotent in having it respected.

Another territorial claim by Armenians are the provinces of Kars, Ardahan and Olti, along with Akhalkalak which was ceded to Georgia. This are encompasses about 60,000 square kilometers, which would represent the inner heart of an Armenian homeland.

Another manifestation of the Armenian's claim for justice has to do with Soviet Armenia itself. There is the immediate concern of the return to Soviet Armenia of the Armenian provinces of "Lori" and "Akhalkalak" which are today under Georgian administration. These territories had always been

densely populated by Armenians' and as mentioned earlier, they were separated from Soviet Armenia in culmination to two Turkish-Russian agreements, namely the Treaty of Moscow (March 1921) and the Kars Conference (October 1921).

Above all, the Armenians demand that Turkish crimes of genocide committed against the Armenian people be condemned by the international community, perhaps through the United Nations or some other body. The Armenians also demand from Turkey to confess its crimes of the past and make restitutions retroactively.(106)

There must be a recognition of the fact that Turkish genocide is continuing as long as the Armenians are not permitted to return to their homeland and are continuously losing their identity in foreign lands. Moreover, Turkey must stop its destruction of Armenian monuments and traces of the Armenian past, since these and others are vital to the preservation of Armenian heritage and so essential to the Armenian identity of today and tomorrow.(107)

To bring an end to injustice, the larger part of the Armenian homeland, which have been almost emptied of their native Armenian population and are currently under Turkish rule, should be restored to its rightful owners, the Armenian people.(108)

The above claims are considered essential to Armenian nationhood and future well being, without which the future of the Armenian people will have no connection with its past even in Soviet Armenia which has been undergoing changes contradictory with its rich heritage.(109)

As far as the issue of "Nagorno Karabagh" is concerned, national frustration and animosities are becoming more acute to deal with by the Soviet authorities, because nationalism of the minority peoples of the USSR have grown and intensified in recent years. The "Karabagh" issue has portrayed a great deal of nationalist frustration in the Soviet Union, which is emerging to be a policy dilemma for the Soviet leadership. Forces for ethnic change are pushing for the evolution of the system, however, the current leadership is vehemently resisting it, which might

eventually lead to an open confrontation and explosion. What is requested from the Soviet leadership is the implementation of the process of decentralization as espoused in Gorbachev's "Perestroika and Glasnost" policies. However, Armenians in Soviet Armenia and in the Diaspora still wait for a favourable decision from the Soviet Presidium in regard to their just demands. Moreover, the Armenians all over the world, convinced of the justice of their cause, continue to believe in the international conscience as well as in the ideals of democracy - the essence of Liberty, Equality and Justice - despite the apathy of nations, they still insist on a just solution.

XIV. FOOTNOTES

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 103. Time Magazine, No. 26, June 27, 1988, p.8.
 104. Time Magazine, No. 28, July 11, 1988, p.9, see also a comprehensive article on the article on the "Nagorno Karabagh" issue, published in Arabic by Al-Quds newspaper, April 4, 1988. Furthermore, The Jerusalem Post, published a series of reports on the "Karabagh" conflict, during the months of February, March, April, May and June of 1988.
 105. Jonathan Steele, "The Armenian Wild Card", The Guardian, August 7, 1988, p.8.
 106. Hassassian, "Armenia's Struggle for Self-Determination", p.37.
 107. Ibid.; For Turkish human rights violations, see "Christian Minorities of Turkey" a report produced by the Churches Committee on Migrant Workers in Europe, Brussels, Sept. 1979; see also an overview of the Churches Committee on Migrant Workers in Europe, a report on the situation of the Christian Minorities in Turkey since the Military Coup d'Etat of Sept. 1980, moreover, a complete report on the minorities situation in Turkey from Sept. 1980 - Feb. 1984, is published in Dutch, "Christelijke Mindertuden van Turkije", Leiden, 1984.
 108. A dossier presented to the UNESCO National Congress Club's session 1980, "Sauver ce qui peut Encore Etre Sauve . . ." Les Monuments Armeniens de Turquie, Lyon, 1980; see also "Le Genocide Armenien un Silence Impossible" a report by the Human Rights Commission, 1974, paragraph 30, France 1979.
 109. Hassassian, "Armenia's Struggle for Self-Determination", p.38.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Manuel S. Hassassian was born in Jerusalem in 1954. At present, he is Assistant Professor of International Politics and Relations, and holds the position of Dean of students at Bethlehem University in the West Bank.

Dr. Hassassian has written several articles in Arabic and in English on the Armenian and Palestinian Questions, respectively. He published two booklets on the Armenian Question, entitled "Armenia's Struggle for self-Determination", and "The A.R.F. As a Revolutionary Party 1890-1921", in 1983. However, his latest Book entitled, "The Internal Political Factionalism Within the Palestine National Movement 1919-1939", published in 1987.

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Dr. Hassassian received his B.A. in Comparative Politics from the American University of Beirut, and his M.A. degree from the University of Toledo, Ohio, in the field of International Relations, and his Ph.D degree from the University of Cincinnati, Ohio in International Relations and Middle East politics and History.

ARMENIAN SOCIAL STATISTICS

Population of Soviet Armenia

1940	1,320,000
1959	1,763,000
1966	2,239,000
1970	2,492,000
1975	2,790,000

Population of Erevan

1917	34,000
1926	65,000
1939	204,000
1970	767,000
1975	899,000

In addition, there is a substantial Armenian population living outside ASSR but within the Soviet Union:

Azerbaijan SSR	560,000
Georgian SSR	550,000
Russian SFSr	330,000
Others	60,000

Total	1,500,000



Outside the Soviet Union, the estimates are as follows:

USA and Canada	450,000
Turkey	250,000
Iran	200,000
France	200,000
Lebanon	180,000
Syria	150,000
Others	570,000

Total	2,000,000

APPENDIX IV

Administrative Divisions in Ottoman Armenia after 1870



President Wilson's Award, November 1920

The Caucasus in the Early Nineteenth Century

